The Ethics of Belief: Relativism and Pragmatism

2. I reject the notion that we can claim universal validity and objective truth for any particular version of ethical beliefs.

I am a skeptic and a relativist. I believe that all large-scale claims about the nature of things and the order of values rooted in objective reality are relative to the time and place of the interpreter (culture or individual) and that we can never know with certainty whether our beliefs correspond to the independently-existing order or not or even whether there is such an order. After applying the rational tests of logical consistency and adequacy to evidence, I embrace a pragmatism that relies on satisfying workability in practice rather than objective certainty about theories of existence and value. I believe that it is literally true that we walk by faith and not by sight. This way of thinking about ethics can provide strong convictions and lead to actions that express them. It can generate and sustain moral passion and afford us courage in adversity. We can assert as vigorously as we need to that views contrary to ours are wrong from our perspective and act accordingly. We can oppose with force practices that are so reprehensible that a milder response is inadequate. Ideally this orientation will combine passionate commitment to a vision with humility of outlook. We can debate with others about the method and content of moral inquiry, while acknowledging that we have no way of knowing for sure which alternatives are in harmony with the objective order of reality and value that exists independently of our belief.