Ideas seem to have a life of their own. Today, we share a rich legacy of concepts that have come down to us through history. They have disseminated widely and have a persistence which belies their ephemeral character. Ideas affect everyone and yet not everyone is aware of them or how they developed into the forms that affect us. When historians first began to delve into the origins of these intellectual constructs only a small group, the educated elite, had even the notion that there was a subject into which to investigate.
The first organized method of investigation into the history of ideas was that structure which Arthur O. Lovejoy's seminal tome, The Great Chain of Being, best exemplifies. This 'Great Chain of Being' was the concept of an hierarchically ordered universe; i.e., that there was a ladder of hierarchy from stones to God. This concept accepted the geocentric universe and explicated the epistemological rationale behind it. On a mundane level it provided security through hierarchy for the common people. Moreover, its attempt to show the scheme of things is an intelligible and rational one. Lovejoy believed that this same tenet about the structure of nature, as one in a limited number of central Western ideas, lay in the background of early modern science and influenced the scientific hypotheses of the period.(1)
His apprehension of this concept as a basal one in the gave rise to his structure for investigating the life of ideas through the use of the history of ideas model. This is a reductive paradigm that considers a single idea and traces its path through history. Thus, it looks at ideas or, more specifically, an idea, in isolation. Lovejoy proposed that ideas do not change through history even though circumstances may be complex and situations may appear different on the surface. He believed that when the circumstance is analyzed, the underlying ideas can be identified and traced to their respective constant progenitors. Lovejoy was hoping to find fundamental connections throughout the life of any particular idea which he could track throughout history. He called ideas "primary, persistent or recurrent dynamic units." He contended that philosophical systems all have elementary ideas in common and he attempted to simplify the complexity of historical philosophy by identifying those single ideas that, in combination, composed building blocks of the philosophical concepts.(2)
Lovejoy enumerated what he saw as the principles of ideas which the history of ideas studies. First, these principles are implicit. They are the presumptions of the society in which they function as foundational elements, normally below the level of consciousness. Next, they influence all the intellectual pursuits of that society. All of these activities have these principles as axioms and these premises are therefore taken for granted as part of the philosophical framework. Additionally, the determination of vulnerability of philosophical tendencies to 'metaphysical pathos' is a significant factor. Metaphysical pathos is defined by Lovejoy as those philosophical ideas which induce a feeling of well-being in the philosophers or cognoscenti of the period. These tendencies are reinforced by their positive feedback from the society. Also, the semantic context of the vocabulary of the society is important. That is, the understanding of what Lovejoy calls 'sacred words' in time and society. Words change connotation through time and space and these differences in meaning must be considered. Lastly, the idea must be traceable to a particular idea expressed by an early European philosopher.(3)
There are other attributes within an idea that are investigated by historians of ideas. The idea must be traceable, linearly, through all disciplines of history. Any particular idea has its correlative in all historical concentrations, the history of philosophy, of art, of religion, of literature, of science and of politics and can be uncovered within any or all in its pure form. Therefore, the disciplines of history have more in common than commonly thought since all have the central connection of one or more particular ideas. Additionally, Lovejoy is particularly keen on the literature of an age as being a carrier of ideas. Expansion of this property also allows for the proposition of the artificiality of national and linguistic separation when investigating ideas. He posits that ideas are universal, so that international or inter-linguistic differences are not as great as inter-generational differences produced by the passage of time. Those time separations are more important in creating distinction in the foundations of society than mere space or language barriers, thus they can be used to better explain changes in concepts from one age to the next so as to be able to identify the common principle as it appears in any discrete era. In addition, evidence of ideas is found in the collective educated elite, not just the musings of philosophers of the time. He even argues that the feel of an age is better represented by lesser writers, since the best works contain eternal verities and the poorer literature is more apt to reflect the essential principles of the era and thus more able to exhibit the fundamental idea(s) to the investigator.(4)
However, even Lovejoy acknowledges that paradigms of one age seem eminently logical and conclusive to the inhabitants of that age, but are almost surely destined not to appear that way to subsequent ages. And there are several difficulties with the use of the history of ideas model that have come to light. The history of ideas is focused on the elite of any particular time and even more on the philosophic and historical professions and this narrow focus is a drawback which impedes and constrains the investigator to consider only a particular set of evidence. Further, it is almost exclusively involved in the use of abstractions without taking into consideration contemporaneous contextual considerations which might bear on those abstractions. In addition, even though it may sometimes use lesser literature as a basis for understanding a particular society, it still uses a severely circumscribed base of people and an elitist nucleus. Moreover, it is linear, proceeding as it does from one era to the next tracing a single idea through its different manifestations or its incorporation into the intellectual currents of the time. This means that it has to prove that the philosophy previously indicated as containing the idea has a pertinence to the subsequent use of the idea. However, ideas are not static, but metamorphose as they interact with other ideas, time, environment, and society. The history of ideas is restricted by this, since it cannot account for the supersedure of an idea nor for the basis of its incorporation into another.(5)
Another predicament, which also highlights the circumscribed nature of the history of ideas, is the base of literature used in developing and tracing the history of an idea. This is the notion of using only one text from an author. Through the years certain books have become recognized as the exemplars of a particular age or school of thought and are known as 'canonical' texts. These tend to be the principle writings of well-known European men; e.g., Machiavelli's The Prince, Newton's Principia Mathematica, Smith's The Wealth of Nations, Locke's Two Treatises of Government, et alia. Thus, there is a fundamentally restrictive nature in this area of investigation. For a more complete picture of the author's attitudes and concepts one must needs read the writer's entire production. For example, Newton's primary work frames a mechanistic universe on a strictly rational base. However, he also delved into astrology and alchemy, yet this segment of Newton's character would not be apparent without reference to his other writings and notes. The integration of these other aspects into our conception of the man's thoughts draws into question conclusions solely made from consulting his magnum opus. In addition, this ignores ideas or concepts which, although present in a society, do not constitute the mainstream and thus, are excluded from the parameters of the investigation. This tends to reinforce the major social, political and cultural biases of the era and perpetuate the predominant white male social base. We can see that the history of ideas contains significant impediments and it has lost favor in the community of historians for that reason.
The other major method of tracing ideas through history is intellectual history. Intellectual history is integrative, as opposed to the reductive nature of the history of ideas. It traces the antecedents of the structure of intellectual thought and shows the mutation of them through the ages. Intellectual history looks at the context of time and what an idea means and meant. Additionally, rather than following theorists, it follows social context, including lesser influences, with the intent to understand the Zeitgeist of the time or place. It looks at the interaction of the idea with society using the concept of audience availability; that is, the interaction with or consideration of popular culture and the incidence of literacy. This grants insight into the processes which impelled the development of the idea because of its ability to look at the contextual situation and consider intentions. Moreover, it examines the permutations which the interaction of ideas create. As an example, it probes the combination of ancient Greek political philosophy with the Judeo-Christian moral imperatives. It also looks at how these clashed, as in the Enlightenment's elevation of reason and rational thought, which came out of the Greek tradition, over the Judeo-Christian belief system that relied on faith and was the basis of Medieval thought. Intellectual history also considers the integration of a number of ideas into a concept and what that means for the contemporaneous society and its posterity.
As we used Lovejoy's work to examine the history of ideas model, let us use Marvin Perry's An Intellectual History of Modern Europe as one example of the intellectual history paradigm. Perry also finds the genesis of Western intellectual history in ancient times. However, his focus is not restricted to a single, simple idea, but can accommodate the amalgam of Greek rationality and Hebrew ethical thought that supports Western civilization. Moreover, his approach is unifying. The creation of the ideals of reason, freedom, and human dignity are Western constructs which proceed from an amalgamation of the Greek and Hebrew foundations. He is able to trace the development of these concepts from their origins in ancient civilization and to show how the bases for them transformed through the ages to become what they have today. The fundamental principle, as opposed to the history of ideas, is change. Lovejoy tells us that ideas are constant and immutable, Perry contends that their ability to reform through the ages to accommodate the changes in the world is their foundation.(6)
This accommodation can be seen in the way Perry describes the progression of Western intellectual history from its roots in ancient Greek rationalism and Judeo-Christian ethics and conceptions of god. The connections that Perry makes in the course of Western civilization show a progression of dichotomous relations between these two systems of thought with one or the other ascendant at any particular point. However, there is also a note of integration and accommodation of each with the other that represents a leitmotiv running throughout. In Perry's paradigm we see a continual process of building, destruction and reintegration, as if two buildings had been erected side by side and now and again one or the other was damaged to a great degree and both were rebuilt over time, so that eventually the building materials became confused and ultimately a single edifice with many incongruous areas resulted.
We have seen that the difference between the history of ideas and intellectual history is a difference between reductive and integrative approaches. In order to clarify this distinction, we can juxtapose some interpretations of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. First, let us start with time. Although this is not specifically part of the Scientific Revolution or the Enlightenment, it is a conception whose parameters changed immensely with Machiavelli in the Renaissance and modified the existing sense of biblical time. This biblical time sense was replaced by the sense of scientific time that considers time real and sequential and everywhere the same. Further, the calendar and the clock no longer ran to salvation. Sacred time was, however, the model for historic, linear time.(7) Lovejoy simply does not deal with this.
In Lovejoy's history of ideas the Scientific Revolution initiated by Copernicus, Kepler, and others was not the true foundation of the new way of thinking within the educated elite of the time, but rather the true crux of the philosophical environment was the rediscovery or reflection of the Platonic ideas which had been suppressed by Christian Medieval thought.(8) However, in the intellectual history representation of Perry, the Scientific Revolution is an evolution which proceeded from prior changes, destroyed the Medieval world view and set up the scientific method of rigorous and systematic observation and experimentation leading to the significant discoveries of that era. Plus, through the art of the Renaissance, mathematics laid the foundations for the perception of nature as a mechanistic system with laws that could be understood and expressed mathematically. Reason was back with a vengeance after the mysticism of Medieval times. The Scientific Revolution changed habits of thinking and started the modern world and mentalité. However, there was a continuation of mysticism and belief in magic that is found during the Scientific Revolution; we have already noted Newton's continuing belief in astrology. In addition, Kepler's motivation was to find the perfection of God in the harmony of the universe.(9) Therefore, although the changes wrought by the Scientific Revolution were enormous, they did not sweep away entirely the previous foundations, for we see some of the concepts reworked or continued. It is this evolution and/or continuity that creates problems for the history of ideas, for it has difficulty accommodating these, as opposed to intellectual history in which they are an integral part.
The new world view of the Scientific Revolution set the base for the Enlightenment, according to Perry. The philosophes, as the Enlightenment intellectuals were known, tried to create a rational and humane society by rejecting theology and human depravity. They adopted and integrated the rational outlook of the Greeks, the Christian belief in equality, the secular perspective and individualism of the Renaissance, and a humanistic attitude in a cosmopolitan movement that had its center in Paris. They were anti-religion, seeing in it only irrationality and superstition, but not amoral. The philosophes used the methods of the Scientific Revolution, out of which they sprang, in an attempt to find basic laws for society, as Newton had for science. However, even though they rejected religion, they did not reject morality. What we see in Perry's example of intellectual history is an unifying tendency and adaptation of and to trends in society in addition to those in the intellectual arena.(10)
Lovejoy had a different interpretation of the Enlightenment philosophes. They had what Lovejoy calls esprits simplistes, which is to say that although they acknowledged the complexity of the universe and the unknowable as God's creation, they believed that matters that impacted humans were comprehensible and that the principles undergirding these matters were simple and knowable. He argues that they were modest about humankind's ability to pierce the curtain of knowledge at the universal level, but were confident that their faculties were enough to apprehend knowledge at the human and practical level. Pope's "Know then thyself! Presume not God to scan! The proper study of mankind is man" sets bounds for inquiry and presumes an underlying simplicity.(11) It occurs to the author that Lovejoy's interpretation of the philosophes is specious because he uses a similar search for and belief in simplicity as his paradigm and it would appear that he is projecting his parameters onto them, anachronistically.
Both the history of ideas and intellectual history have given us structures by which to discern the intellectual currents of history. Concomitantly, they have given us insight into the current paradigms of intellectual precepts. They have also assisted us in the understanding of what it is our fundamental concepts say about and to us. Though limitations plague both methodologies and one has superseded the other, they have both contributed to the understanding of the processes by which humans have made sense of the world around them, from ancient times to the present and, thus fulfill the criteria of valid historical investigation.
To understand the concepts and premises by which today's society functions, democracy, capitalism, liberty; we must understand the path of development that these ideas followed. Not only need we know the postulates of Locke, Montesqueiu, Smith, Marx, Machiavelli, et cetera; but we also need to comprehend how they developed their ideas, where their trains of thought originated and how they have evolved over time. Only then can we proceed from a base of knowledge to determine the effects on history and the present and even possibly make some small divination of the future terrain. Therefore, historical investigatory frameworks such as the history of ideas and its successor, intellectual history, will be necessary tools in the kit of historians for some time to come.
(2)Lovejoy, A. O. The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 4, 7, 16.
(3)Ibid., pp. 9-14.
(4)Ibid., pp. 14, 16.
(5)Ibid., pg. 23.
(6)Perry, pp. 1-44.
(7)Appleby, Joyce; Hunt, Lynn; Jacob, Margaret. Telling the Truth about History. NY: W.W. Norton, 1994, pp. 53-55, 57.
Perry, pg. 53.
(8)Lovejoy, pg. 99.
(9)Perry, pp. 63-65, 67, 77.
(10)Ibid., pg. 90, 121-124.
(11)Lovejoy, pp. 7-9.